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Time machine (1988–2001)
S. Krasnikov
“...don’t drive yourself crazy try-
ing to resolve the paradoxes of
time travel.”
L. S. de Camp [1]
The time machine (in its science fiction incarnation) was born back in 19-th
century [2], i. e. well before the concept of spacetime appeared. However, it
was relativity that provided an adequate language for discussing and studying
time machines. In particular, according to special relativity, our world is the
Minkowski space and the life history of a pointlike particle is a curve in this
space, see Fig. 1. In these terms one can formulate, in quite a meaningful
Figure 1: No time machine in special relativity.
way, the question about the existence of time machines, or — which is the
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same — about the possibility of an observer meeting his older self. Namely,
one can ask, whether a world line of a particle may have a self-intersection.
The answer is straightforward. To make a loop a curve must somewhere leave
the null cone as shown in Fig. 1. A particle with such a world line would
exceed the speed of light and, insofar as no tachyons have been found yet,
the time machine is impossible in special relativity.
In general relativity the situation is much less trivial. According to this
Figure 2: Timelike loops due to the non-trivial geometry (a), or topology
(b) of the spacetime.
theory, our spacetime must be a smooth Lorentzian manifold, i. e. in suffi-
ciently small regions it must be ‘approximately Minkowskian’, but at large
scale (as long as the Einstein equations with a reasonable matter source hold),
it may have any geometry and topology. There may be holes, handles, see
Fig. 2a; almost whatever one wants. And the null cones need not any more
look all in the same direction. In particular, spacetimes are conceivable with
closed or self-intersecting timelike curves.
A simple example is the Minkowski space rolled into a cylinder, see
Fig. 2b. Locally everything is fine in this spacetime, but due to its non-
trivial global structure, an observer can meet his younger self. Such space-
times [3, 4], however, do not deserve the name ‘time machine’, because the
closed timelike curves always exist in them. They are not created at some
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moment. In this sence, a better example is the Deutsch–Politzer (DP) space
[5], which we shall describe as a result of the following surgery. Make two
cuts in the Minkowski space and glue the upper bank of lower cut to the
Figure 3: (a) Preparation of the DP spacetime from the Minkowski plane.
(b) All lines (1,2,3) are actually continuous.
lower bank of the upper cut and vice verse, as shown in Fig. 3a, so that a
cylinder appears attached to the plane. It is convenient to draw the resulting
spacetime still as the Minkowski plane, see Fig. 3b, and just to keep in mind
that any curve reaching the lower segment must be continued from the upper
and, vice verse.
The DP space contains timelike loops, which all lie to the future of a good
(causal) region, so it fits the name ‘time machine’. This model, of course,
in unsuitable for tackling the problem of building a time machine (it gives
no clue into what could force the spacetime to evolve into the time machine
instead of just remaining Minkowskian, see below), but is quite adequate in
studying what can happen, if for some reason or other a time machine did
appear.
One can often read that the existence of a time machine would lead to
awful paradoxes contradicting common sense and the notion of free will, or
even proving the impossibility of the time machine. Now we can verify this
assertion. Let us begin with the notorious grandfather paradox, which is a
story of a researcher R, who asks his grandson G to trip (by time machine) to
the past and to kill him (R) in infancy. The grandson tries to grant his wish
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(see Fig. 4a), but the problem is: if G succeeds than the baby does not grow
Figure 4: A paradox admits a simple solution, when the initial conditions
being fixed at ti ∈ (t1, t2) are affected by the outcome of the experiment (a),
and none otherwise (b).
up and, correspondingly, does not have any grandchildren that could kill him.
Which proves that the grandson fails to kill the baby. The circumstances
are not detailed, so there is much room for explanations just why he fails.
Say, the gun can jam, or the shooter can miss. However, if we arm
grandsons again and again (hundreds of times) and always only bad shooters
get reliable guns, this, of course, would look miraculous. Why cannot we
give a good gun to a marksman? Is not this a restriction on our freedom of
will?
In fact, the solution of the grandfather paradox is quite simple. The point
is that only those persons are available for our experiment whose grandfathers
by whatever reasons were not killed. So, what prevents us from arming a
sufficiently good shooter with a sufficiently good gun is not problems with
our freedom of will1, but just the shortage of such shooters. And the better
our guns are the fewer marksmans are at our disposal.
1The grandson, being born with already known future life, is such an unusual object
that we need not worry about his freedom of will.
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A more detailed analysis shows [6] that to avoid such simple solutions one
must consider experiments performed before the time machine appeared [5].
Indeed, suppose one kindly requests a person to wait until a time machine is
built (at some time in the future), to enter it, and to kill his (the traveler’s)
younger self (see Fig. 4b). The situation in the time machine is exactly as
paradoxical as in the grandfather case — if the test person is dead when he
meets his younger self, he cannot kill the latter, so why he is dead? And if he
is alive and shooting, then how come the victim survived? This time, how-
ever, the initial conditions do not depend on what occurs in the time machine
and the paradox has no simple resolutions. Moreover, being formulated in
terms of pointlike particles (which allows one to check all possibilities) it has
no resolutions at all [6].
How to fight the time travel paradox? The most obvious way out would
be to forbid the time machines by fiat, to postulate causality. But this is not
so easy. In 1988 Morris, Thorne, and Yurtsever (MTY) published a paper,
where they considered a spacetime M shown in Fig. 5. Geometrically M can
Figure 5: (a) The dashed lines connect the identified points. (b) The section
t = −2 of M .
be obtained by removing two close cylinders C1 and C2 from the Minkowski
space and gluing together the boundaries B1,2 ≡ BdC1,2 of the resulting holes
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(the junction is then smoothed out by curving appropriately a close vicinity
of B1 = B2). The cylinders are taken to be parallel to the t-axis except that
C2 has a bend at, say, −1 < t < 1. The gluing must respect the following
rule
p = p′ ⇒ τ(p) = τ(p′), (∗)
where τ(x) is defined to be the length of the longest (recall that the metric
is Lorentzian) timelike curve lying in B1,2 and connecting x with the surface
t = −2. Due to the bend, τ grows with time slower on B2 than on B1 (the
‘twin paradox’). Correspondingly, some of the identified points were causally
related in the ‘initial’ (Minkowski) space. So, there are timelike loops in M .
Physically, M presents a spacetime in which a wormhole (see Fig. 5b) evolves
so that the distance (in the ambient flat space) between its mouths changes
at −1 < t < 1 without significant changes in the form or length of the throat
(it is this last condition that necessitates the rule (∗)).
The MTY time machine cannot be banished as easily as the DP one,
because we have (in assumption that wormholes exist, they are large and
stable, etc.) a specific prescription of how to build it. Precisely this was
the point of [7]: assuming the time machines are prohibited, exactly how
this prohibition is enforced? Suppose, one finds a wormhole, pushes one of
its mouths, then pulles it back. What exactly will go wrong? What will
prevent a closed causal curve from appearance? It was such statement of the
problem that gave birth to the time machine as an element of the physical,
rather than philosophical, or science fiction realm.
A mechanism that could prevent the appearance of a closed timelike curve
was sought for more than a decade, but has never been found [8]. In this sense
causality still remains unprotected [9]. But does it mean that an advanced
civilization can build a time machine and face the ensuing paradoxes? No,
it does not. The point is that there is a great difference between observing
a time machine appearing by itself and creating one. And while the former
seemingly is possible, the latter is not. The difference is well exemplified by
the DP space. We can prepare a flat region in our spacetime and, for all
we know, a time machine well may appear there. But just as well it may
not, and we shall have a usual Minkowski space. The choice is up to the
spacetime and we can do nothing to affect it. Surprisingly, exactly the same
is true for any time machine, be it based on a wormhole [7], a cosmic string
[10], or whatever else [9]. A theorem [11] proved in 2001 says: Any spacetime
obeying local laws and having no causal loops in its past, has a causal maximal
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extension. Which means (since the Einstein equations are local) that within
general relativity a time machine cannot be built.
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